Lee v. Lee : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1988
Lee v. Lee : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brent J. Jensen; Attorney for Respondent.
John L. Chidester; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Lee v. Lee, No. 880276 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1046
BRIEF 
JTAH 
DOCUMENT 
( F U 
SO 
)OCKET NO. ^CZKo "CA 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAWANA EGAN LEE, 
Plaintiff and Respondant, : 
v. 
STERLING CALVIN LEE, 
Defendant and Appellant. : 
Case No. 880276-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDANT 
APPEAL FROM FINAL DECREE DATED APRIL 28, 1988, 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAY M. 
HARDING, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
^ AUG 15 1988 ^ 
COURT OF APPEALS 
JOHN L. CHIDESTER 
51 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 43 
Heber City, Utah 84932 
BRENT J. JENSEN 
1 East Center Street 
Suite 211 
Provo, Utah 84681 
Attorney for Appellant Attorney for Respondant 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAWANA EGAN LEE, 
Plaintiff and Respondant, 
v. 
STERLING CALVIN LEE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 880276-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDANT 
APPEAL FROM FINAL DECREE DATED APRIL 28, 1988, 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. THE HONORABLE RAY M. 
HARDING, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
JOHN L. CHIDESTER 
51 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 43 
Heber City, Utah 84832 
BRENT J. JENSEN 
1 East Center Street 
Suite 211 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Appellant Attorney for Respondant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 1 
ARGUMENTS 2 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY LIMITED ITS REVIEW OF THE REQUEST TO 
MODIFY TO THE PERIOD COMMENCING WITH THE DATE OF THE MOST 
RECENT ORDER FOR MODIFICATION. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING ALIMONY TO 
CONTINUE AT A REDUCED AMOUNT. 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Rasband v^ Rasband, 80 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (1988) 6 
Short vA Short, 25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 (1971). . 2, 3, 4 
Stephens v^ Steghens , 728 P. 2d 991 (Utah 1986) 6 
Wilson Vj. Wij.son, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P. 2d 977 4,5 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
18 A.L.R. 2d 18 3,4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it 
followed the general rule that on requests for modification 
of a decree, the question whether there has been a 
substantial change in circumstances is determined with 
respect to the period commencing with the date of the most 
recent order on a motion for modification and not with 
respect to the time since the original decree was entered. 
Defendant fails to show how under the circumstances of 
the instant case, the Trial Court's decision not to eliminate 
alimony could possibly be capricious. The Trial Court's 
decision was rational and reasonable. 
PQINT 11 
The Trial Court has broad discretion to modify decrees 
and his judgment should not be changed absent a showing of 
manifest injustice or inequity to Defendant as to indicate a 
clear abuse of discretion. None of the three courts to 
consider this matter contemplated that alimony should be 
other than permanent. Defendant is not clearly prejudiced by 
paying Plaintiff $50.00 alimony out of his $1,300.00 monthly 
income when Plaintiff is in her early sixties, unemployed, 
lives on $396.80 Social Security disability and has little 
chance of entering the job market. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY LIMITED ITS REVIEW OF THE REQUEST TO 
MODIFY TO THE PERIOD COMMENCING WITH THE DATE OF THE MOST 
RECENT ORDER FOR MODIFICATION. 
The Trial Court properly limited its review of 
Defendant's request to modify the decree of divorce by 
entirely eliminating alimony in this matter to the period 
of time from the most recent order for modification to the 
present and not to the total time since the original decree 
was entered. 
The case of Shojrt v^ Short,, relied upon by Defendant in 
Point I of his brief, adequately sets forth the general rule 
that the review of requests for modification should be 
limited to the time since the most recent order of 
modification and not extend to the time since the original 
decree was entered. 
There is but one point on appeal: That the 
court erred in failing to compare the parties' 
present circumstances in relation to those at the 
time of the decree. 
By and large in the ordinary divorce case the 
appellant's contention would be meritorious, and 
the cases decided by this court sustain his 
contention. The difficulty here is that in 
exercising the latitude of discretion accorded to 
and recognized in the trial court in these domestic 
relations matters the appellant's contention is not 
immalleable, but must yield to reason and the 
equities attendant in each particular case. In the 
instant case, we must and do assume that the court 
did not intend that the $75 alimony award would be 
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eliminated if Mrs. S. obtained a job paying $75 per 
month,
 m or even $175 per month, or even $389 
per month, the income of Mrs. S. at her job at time 
of the third petition to eliminate the alimony. We 
think the facts in this case themselves reflect no 
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court 
in refusing to vacate the $75 alimony award, and we 
base our conclusion here, not necessarily on any 
authority to the effect that the court views the 
facts in relation to the last petition for 
modification, but because the denial was not 
capricious when viewed in the light of 
circumstances existing at the time of the divorce, 
the $75 award implemented by a necessary and 
inescapable assumption by the court that Mrs. S. 
could not survive under any conceivable hypothesis 
on $75 per month, and there is nothing in the 
record to indicate she had any other means of 
1ivi1ihood. 
Short v^ Short, 25 Utah 2d 326, 327, 481 P.2d 54, 55 (1971). 
In Short the Utah Supreme Court did not find that the 
Trial Court had abused its discretion in dismissing Mr. 
Short's third petition to eliminate alimony and cited two 
reasons for its decision. First, the general rule that courts 
review requests for modification from the time of the last 
modification and, second, that even when viewed from the time 
of the divorce the court's actions in that case were not 
capricous. 
The general rule for the period of time considered in a 
review of request for modification is set forth in the work 
cited in the footnote in the Sho£t, case. 
Where there have been one or more previous 
decisions on motions for modification of a decree, 
the question whether there has been a substantial 
change in the circumstances of the parties is 
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determined with respect to the period commencing 
with the date of the most recent order on a motion 
for a modification and not with respect to the time 
since the original decree was entered. 
18 A.L.R 2d at 18-19. 
Certainly it was not erroneous nor an abuse of 
discretion for the Trial Court in this matter to follow this 
general rule and limit its review of any alleged change of 
circumstances to the period begining with the date of the 
most recent modification order. 
The Trial Court's action in limiting its review as set 
forth above was also not capricious, even when viewed from 
the date of the original decree. Paragraph 4 of the original 
1971 decree sets forth alimony in the amount of $200.00 
"until further order of the Court". The court's further order 
that alimony now be reduced to $50.00 cannot be said to be 
capricious merely because the court did not eliminate alimony 
altogether. 
POINT H 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING ALIMONY TO 
CONTINUE AT A REDUCED AMOUNT. 
It has been long recognized, as for example in the Sho£t, 
case cited above in Point I, that "the trial judge has 
considerable latitude of discretion in such matters and that 
his judgment should not be changed lightly, and in fact, not 
at all, unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity 
4 
as to indicate a clear abuse of discretion." Wilson Y^ 
Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d 977. 
In the instant case, the original decree provided for 
alimony in the amount of $200.80 per month "until further 
order of the Court." This was modified in 1976 to $75.00 per 
month "until said plaintiff obtains work and receives gross 
income of $200.00 or more per month at which time said 
alimony shall be reduced to the sum of $50.00 per month 
.." The Trial Court in the instant case found that the 
disability payments Plaintiff now receives are in lieu of 
wages and accordingly ordered a reduction in alimony as 
contemplated by the 1976 modification. 
The language of the original decree is clear that the 
trial court there did not contemplate the elimination of 
alimony to Plaintiff upon her obtaining employment. The 1976 
modification is even more clear that alimony was not to be 
eliminated, but merely reduced, when Plaintiff obtained 
sufficient employment. Thus, at no time has the trial court 
expressed the idea that alimony should be entirely eliminated 
in the instant case. 
That the court in the instant matter has refused 
Defendant's request to eliminate alimony is not an abuse of 
discretion, but a full exercise of its discretion to decide 
such matters upon the facts and circumstances of each 
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individual case. In Rasband v^ Rasband, 80 Utah Adv. Rep 32, 
32 (1988), this court stated that "This court will not 
disturb the trial court's award of spousal support absent a 
showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
P§II§I Y-L P§££§!» 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986).M Defendant 
has failed to show how the trial court has abused its 
discretion in this matter or how the court's order is 
prejudicial to him. 
It is hard to see how Defendant is prejudiced by being 
ordered to pay Plaintiff $50.00 out of his $1,300.00 
monthly income. Plaintiff's only other source of income is 
her monthly $396.80 Social Security disability check. Adding 
the $50.00 alimony to the $396.80 disability income gives 
Plaintiff a total monthly income of $446.80. This is just 
over one-third of Defendant's resulting monthly income of 
$1,250.00. Certainly Defendant is not thus prejudiced. 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Stephens y^ Stephens, 
728 P.2d 991, 993 (Utah 1986) 
Here, defendant is a woman in her forties who 
did not pursue her own career during the parties' 
marriage, has few marketable skills, and earns one-
third of plaintiff's salary, with little chance, 
absent further education, to increase that amount. 
Those criteria well support a finding of need for 
alimony, and we uphold that trial court's decision. 
Although Defendant seems to urge in his brief that 
Plaintiff should be compelled to enter the work force and 
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support herself to spare him the trouble of paying alimony, 
as pointed out in the Stephens case, this is not always 
possible. Plaintiff receives Social Security disability 
because she is disabled and unable to hold a regular job. She 
is also in her early sixties, has few marketable skills and 
thus has little chance of entering the job market. Under 
these circumstances, the Trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion to continue alimony. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court properly limited its review of 
Defendant's request to eliminate alimony to the period after 
the 1976 modification. The circumstances of the parties prior 
to that time were considered by the previous trial courts. 
The Trial Court's refusal to terminate alimony in light of 
the respective incomes and needs of the parties is not an 
abuse of discretion. This Court should refuse to change the 
judgment of the Trial Court and allow that judgment to stand. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Brent 3/Jensen, attorney for 
Plaintiff Respondant 
